The secret-key agreement problem over wiretap channels controlled by a state parameter is studied. The entire state sequence is known (non-causally) to the sender but not to the receiver and the eavesdropper. Upper and lower bounds on the secret-key capacity are established both with and without public discussion.
INTRODUCTION
Many applications in cryptography require that the legitimate terminals have shared secret keys, not available to unauthorized parties. Information theoretic security encompasses the study of source and channel coding techniques to generate secret-keys between legitimate terminals. In the channel coding literature, an early work in this area is the wiretap channel model [1] . It consists of three terminals one sender, one receiver and one eavesdropper. The sender communicates to the receiver and the eavesdropper over a discrete-memoryless broadcast channel. A notion of equivocation-rate the normalized conditional entropy of the transmitted message given the observation at the eavesdropper, is introduced, and the tradeoff between information rate and equivocation rate is studied. Perfect secrecy capacity, defined as the maximum information rate under the constraint that the equivocation rate approaches the information rate asymptotically in the block length is of particular interest. Information transmitted at this rate can be naturally used as a shared secret-key between the sender and the receiver. In the source coding setup [2, 3] the two terminals observe correlated source sequences and use a public discussion channel for communication. Any information sent over this channel is available to an eavesdropper. The terminals generate a common secret-key that is concealed from the eavesdropper in the same sense as the wiretap channel the equivocation
In the present paper we consider a secret-key agreement problem when the sender and the receiver communicate over a channel controlled by a state parameter. The state parameter is known to the sender but not to the receiver or the eavesdropper. A good coding scheme for this problem exploits two sources of uncertainty at the eavesdropper one due to the lack of knowledge of state parameter at the eavesdropper, and the other due to the equivocation introduced by the channel. It has the flavor of both source and channel coding problems.
In related works, the problem of secret-message transmission over wiretap channels controlled by a state parameter is studied in [4, 5] . In these works an achievable coding scheme is proposed that combines Gel'fand Pinsker coding and coding for the wiretap channel. In contrast the coding scheme proposed in this paper for the secret-key agreement problem is substantially different and in general yields higher achievable rates. The case of secret-key agreement over wiretap channels controlled by symmetric CSI at the sender and the receiver has been recently investigated in [6] .
PROBLEM SETUP
As Fig. 1 illustrates, the channel model has three terminals -a sender, a receiver and an eavesdropper. The sender communicates with the other two terminals over a discretememoryless-channel with transition probability p y r ,y e |x,s (·) where x denotes the channel input symbol, whereas y r and y e denote the channel output symbols at the receiver and the eavesdropper respectively. The symbol s denotes a state variable that controls the channel transition probability. We assume that it is sampled i.i.d. from a distribution p s in each channel use. Further, the entire sequence s n is known to the sender before the communication begins.
In defining the secret-key capacity we separately consider the cases when a public discussion channel is and is not present.
No Public Discussion
A length n encoder is defined as follows. The sender samples a random variables u from the conditional distribution p u|s n (·|s n r ). The encoding function produces a channel input sequence x n = f n (u, s n ) and transmits it over n uses of the channel. At time i the symbol x i is transmitted and the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper observe output symbols y ri and y ei respectively, sampled from the conditional distribution p y r ,y e |x,s (·). The sender and receiver compute secret keys κ = g n (u, s n ) and l = h n (y n r ). A rate R is achievable if there exists a sequence of encoding functions such that for some sequence ε n that vanishes as n → ∞, we have that s κ κ Figure 1 : Wiretap channel controlled by a state parameter. The channel transition probability p y r ,y e |x,s () is controlled by a state parameter s. The entire source sequence s n is known to the sender but not to the receiver or the eavesdropper. The sender and receiver generate a secret key κ at the end of the transmission.
Pr(κ = l) ≤ ε n and 1 n H(κ) ≥ R − ε n and 1 n I(κ; y n e ) ≤ ε n .
The largest achievable rate is the secret-key capacity.
Presence of Public Discussion
When a public discussion channel is present, the described protocol follows closely the interactive communication protocol in [3] . The sender transmits symbols x 1 ,... ,x n at times 0 < i 1 < i 2 < ... < i n over the wiretap channel. At these times the receiver and the eavesdropper observe symbols y r1 ,... ,y rn and y e1 ,... ,y en respectively. In the remaining times the sender and receiver exchange messages ψ t and φ t where 1 ≤ t ≤ k. For convenience we let i n+1 = k + 1. The eavesdropper observes both ψ t and φ t . More specifically the sender and receiver sample random variables u and v from conditional distributions p u|s n (·|s n r ) and p v (·) and observe that v is independent of (u, s n ).
• At times 0 < t < i 1 , the sender generates φ t = Φ t (u, s n , ψ t−1 ) and the receiver generates ψ t = Ψ t (v , φ t−1 ). These messages are exchanged over the public channel. • At times i j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, the sender generates x j = X j (u, s n , ψ i j −1 ) and sends it over the channel. The receiver and eavesdropper observe y r, j ad y e, j respectively. For these times we set ψ i j = φ i j = 0. • For times i j < t < i j+1 , where 1 ≤ j ≤ n, the sender and receiver compute φ t = Φ t (u, s n , ψ t−1 ) and ψ t = Ψ t (v , y j r , φ t−1 ) respectively and exchange them over the public channel.
• At time k + 1, the sender and receiver compute κ = g n (u, s n , ψ k ) and the receiver computes l = h n (v , y n r , φ k ). We require that for some sequence ε n that vanishes as n → ∞, Pr(κ = l) ≤ ε n and
The secret-key rate is defined as 1 n H(κ) and the largest achievable secret-key rate is the capacity.
MAIN RESULTS
Our main results are upper and lower bounds on the secretkey capacity, which coincide in some special cases. We again consider the cases of no public discussion and public discussion separately.
No Public Discussion
We first provide an achievable rate (lower bound) on the secret-key capacity.
Theorem 1 An achievable secret-key rate without public discussion is
where the maximization is over all auxiliary random variables u that satisfy the Markov condition u → (x, s) → (y r , y e ) and furthermore satisfy the constraint that
The intuition behind the coding scheme is as follows. Upon observing s n , the sender communicates the best possible reproduction u n of the state sequence to the receiver. Now both the sender and the receiver observe a common sequence u n . The set of all codewords u n is binned into 2 n R − bins and the bin-index is declared to be the secret key.
We note that the lower bound can be easily extended to the case of two-sided CSI. If the receiver observes another state sequence s r , correlated with s according to a joint distribution p s,s r (·, ·) then the achievable rate expression (3) holds provided that we augment the received symbol by (y r , s r ).
Finally for the case of symmetric CSI i.e., when s r = s, the constraint (4) is redundant as clearly I(u; y r , s)− I(u; s) ≥ 0 holds. Furthermore the resulting achievable rate,
is indeed the secret-key capacity as established in our earlier work [6] .
Finally we note that the problem of secret-key agreement is different from the secret-message transmission problem considered in [4, 7, 5] . This is because the secret-key can be an arbitrary function of the state sequence (known only to the transmitter) whereas the secret-message needs to be independent function of the state sequence. For comparison, the best known lower bound on the secret-message transmission problem is stated below.
Proposition 1 [4, 7, 5] An achievable secret message rate for wiretap channel with non-causal transmiter CSI is
We note that whenever the maximizing u satisfies, I(u; y e ) > I(u; s) > I(u; y e ), the secret-key rate (3) is strictly better than the secret-message rate (5) .
The following theorem develops an upper bound on secret-key capacity that is amenable to numerical computation.
Theorem 2 The secret-key capacity in absence of public discussion is upper bounded by
where P denotes all the joint distributions p y r ,y e |x,s that have the same marginal distribution as the original channel.
The intuition behind the upper bound is as follows. We create a degraded channel by revealing the output of the eavesdropper to the legitimate receiver. We further assume a channel with two inputs (x n , s n ) i.e., the state sequence s n is not arbitrary, but rather a part of the input codeword with distribution p s r . The secrecy capacity of the resulting wiretap channel is then given by I(x, s; y r |y e ).
Our proposed upper and lower bounds coincide, yielding capacity in some special cases. We present one such case in section 3.3.
With Public Discussion
In this section we provide lower and upper bounds on the secret-key capacity with public discussion. We first provide a lower bound below.
Theorem 3 An achievable secret-key rate with public discussion is:
where R − is the lower bound attained without public discussion in Theorem 1
The achievability scheme involves a natural modification of Maurer's coding scheme [3, 2] to incorporate the presence of the state parameter and involves a single round of discussion. In particular, the sender generate a sequence x n according to the conditional distribution p x|s (x|s) and transmits over n channel uses. At the end of the transmission, the receiver sends the bin index of y n r , so that the sender can recover this sequence given (x n , s n r ). Next we provide an upper bound on the secret-key capacity under public discussion.
Theorem 4 An upper bound on the secret-key capacity is
We note that the upper bound expression (8) is similar to the upper bound expression in (6) except that we cannot minimize over the joint-probability distribution in (8) . This is because the public discussion channel provides a mechanism for feedback and hence the capacity does depend on the joint distribution (not just the marginal distributions). The proof for the upper bound expression in Theorem 4 also significantly more elaborate as it accounts for public discussion. We note that if the channel additionally satisfies y r → (x, s) → y e then the upper and lower bounds in Theorem 3 and 2 coincide. In particular if p x|s is the maximizing distribution in (8) Since R − disc ≤ R + disc , it follows that the two expressions must be equal. This is summarized in the result below.
Theorem 5
The secret-key capacity with public discussion for a DMC channel that satisfies y r → (x, s) → y e is given by
I(x, s; y r |y e ).
(9)
Gaussian Case
We now study the Gaussian special case under an average power constraint. The channel to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper is expressed as:
where z r ∼ N (0, 1) and z e ∼ N (0, 1 + ∆) denote the additive white Gaussian nose and are assumed to be sampled independently. The state parameter s ∼ N (0, Q) is also sampled i.i.d. at each time instance and is independent of both z r and z e . Furthermore, the channel input satisfies an average power constraint E[x 2 ] ≤ P. As the title indicates, we call this setup, secret sharing with dirty paper. Thus the parameter P denotes the signal-to-noise ratio, the parameter Q denotes the interference-to-noise-ratio, whereas ∆ denotes the degradation level of the eavesdropper. We now provide lower and upper bounds on the secret-key capacity with and without public discussion.
Proposition 2
In absence of public discussion, a lower bound on the secret-key capacity is given by,
where the feasible set I is defined below:
The corresponding upper bound on the secret-key capacity without public discussion is given below Proposition 3 In absence of public discussion, an upper bound on the secret-key capacity is given by,
We note that the lower bound expression (12) is maximized when α = 1. Furthermore in this case the right-hand expression reduces to
i.e., the upper and lower bounds coincide if we evaluate the lower bound at α = 1. Thus provided 1 ∈ I , our coding scheme attains capacity.
Theorem 6
The secret-key capacity of the "secret-sharing with dirty paper" channel in absence of public discussion is given by,
provided that the signal-to-noise ratio (P) and the interference-to-noise ratio (Q) satisfy:
In particular if P ≥ 1, the secret-key capacity is given by (14) .
When public discussion between the sender and receiver is allowed Theorem 5 characterizes the secret-key capacity. Note that since (z r , z e ) are independent, the channel model (10) satisfies y r → (x, s) → y e .
Theorem 7
The secret-key capacity of the "secret-sharing with dirty paper" model in the presence of a public discussion channel is given by
Comparing the capacity expressions in Theorem 6 and 5 it is possible to bound the gains from a public discussion channel as we do below.
Proposition 4 For the "secret-sharing with dirty paper" model, the difference between secret-key capacities with and without public discussion is at-most 0.5 b/s/Hz.
Furthermore for a fixed ∆ > 0, as we take P → ∞ we have that
WITHOUT PUBLIC DISCUSSION
In this section we provide the coding scheme and the upper bound for the case when there is no public discussion.
Proof of Theorem 1
A sequence of length n code is described as follows.
Codebook Generation
• Generate a total of 2 n(I(u;y e )−2ε n ) sequences. Each sequence is sampled i.i.d. from a distribution p u (·). • Select a rate R = I(u; y r ) − I(u; y e ) − ε n and randomly partition the set sequences in the previous step into 2 nR bins so that there are 2 n(I(u;y r )−ε n ) sequences in each bin.
Encoding
• Given a state sequence s n the encoder selects a sequence u n randomly from the list of all possible sequences that are jointly typical with s n . • At time i = 1, 2,...,n the encoder transmits symbol x i generated by sampling the distribution p x|u,s (·|u i , s i ).
Secret-key generation
• The decoder upon observing y n r finds a sequence u n jointly typical with y n r . • Both encoder and the decoder declare the bin-index of u n to be the secret-key.
Secrecy Analysis
We need to show that for the proposed encoder and decoder, the equivocation at the eavesdropper satisfies 
where o n (1) is a term that goes to zero as n → ∞. Accordingly note that Figure 4 : Capacity of the "secret-sharing with dirty paper" channel with and without public discussion. In Fig. 2 , we plot the capacity as a function of SNR (dB) when Q = 10 and ∆ = 1. The upper-most curve is the capacity with public-discussion whereas the other two curves denote the upper and lower bounds without discussion. Note that the upper and lower bounds coincide, yielding the capacity for SNR just below 0 dB. In Fig. 3 , we plot the capacity with and without public discussion as a function of ∆ (in dB) when P = 10 dB and Q = 10 dB.
where the last step follows from the fact that there are at-most 2 n(I(u;y e )−o n (1)) sequences in each bin and hence the eavesdropper can decode the codeword u n given the key κ. It remains to lower-bound the first conditional entropy term. We now appropriately bound each term in (20) . First note that since the sequence u n is uniformly distributed among the set of all possible codeword sequences, it follows that
Next, given (u n , s n ), as verified below, the channel to the eavesdropper is memoryless: p y n e |u n ,s n (y n e |u n , s n ) = ∑
x n ∈X n p y n e |u n ,s n ,x n (y n e |u n , s n , x n )p(x n |u n , s n )(x n |u n , s n )
p y e |u,s (y e,i |u i , s i )
The second step above follows from the fact that the channel is memoryless and the symbol x i at time i is generated as a function of (u i , s i ). Hence we have that
Furthermore note that
Finally, in order to lower bound the term I(s n ; y n e |u n ) we let J to be a random variable which equals 1 if (s n , u n ) are jointly typical. Note that Pr(J = 1) = 1 − o n (1). 
where (25) follows from the fact that s n is an i.i.d. sequence and hence conditioned on the fact that (s n , u n ) is a pair of typical sequence there are 2 nH(s|u)−no n (1) possible sequences s n . Substituting (21), (23), (24) and (26) in the lower bound (20) and using the fact that as n → ∞, the summation converges to the mean values, as required.
Proof of Theorem 2
A sequence of length-n code satisfies:
where (27) follows from the Fano's Lemma since the receiver is able to recover the secret-key κ given y n r and (28) is a consequence of the secrecy constraint. Furthermore, note that κ → (x n , s n ) → (y n r , y n e ) holds as the encoder generates the secret key κ. Thus we can bound the rate R = 1 n H(κ) as below:
nR ≤ I(κ; y n r |y n e ) + 2nε n ≤ I(κ, s n , x n ; y n r |y n e ) + 2nε n = I(s n , x n ; y n r |y n e ) + 2nε n = n ∑ i=1 I(s i , x i ; y r,i |y e,i ) + 2nε n ≤ nI(x, s; y r |y e ) + 2nε n where the last step follows from the concavity of the conditional entropy term I(x, s; y r |y e ) in the input distribution p x,s (see e.g., [8] ). Finally since the secret-key capacity only depends on the marginal distribution of the channel and not on the joint distribution we can minimize over all joint distributions with fixed marginal distributions.
WITH PUBLIC DISCUSSION
In this section we provide the proofs of the coding theorem and the converse for the case when there is a public discussion channel allowed.
Proof of Theorem 3
Our coding scheme is closely related to the coding theorem for the channel model in [3, 2] and emulates the generation of correlated source sequences. It consists of the following steps:
• Fix a distribution p x|s . This induces a joint distribution p x,y r ,y e ,s . Let R = I(y r ; x, s) − I(y r ; y e ) − ε n • Partition the set of all typical sequences y n r into 2 n(H(y r |x,s)−o n (1)) bins. Furthermore partition the collection of 2 n(I(y r ;x,s)) sequences in each bin into further 2 nR sequences so that there are 2 n(I(y r ;y e )−ε n ) sequences in each sub-bin.
• Given symbol s i at time i, sample a symbol x i from the conditional distribution p x|s (·) and transmit it over the channel. • The receiver upon observing y n r transmits the bin index of this sequence over the channel. Using the bin index and the knowledge of (x n , s n ) the sender reproduces y n r . • Both the sender and the receiver declare the sub-bin index of y n r as the secret-key.
Following the secrecy analysis in [3, 2] it can be shown that this construction satisfies the secrecy constraint (2) and furthermore attains a rate of R = I(y r ; x, s) − I(y r ; y e ) + o n (1).
Proof of Theorem 4
We now establish a corresponding upper bound on the secretkey capacity. The proof follows closely the upper bounding approach in [3] but it includes modifications to incorporate the state sequence.
First, using the fact that the receiver is able to recover the secret-key and the eavesdropper is subjected to a secrecy constraint (2), we have that
Using the above relations and the fact that R = 1 n H(κ), we note that
where we have introduced F r, j = I(u, s n ; y r, j , y e, j |v ,
To complete the proof, it suffices to show that the following relations in (33) hold I(u, s n ; v |Φ i 1 −1 , Ψ i 1 −1 ) = 0 ( 3 8 ) F r, j − F e, j ≤ I(x j , s j ; y r, j |y e, j ) (39) G r, j − G e, j ≤ 0 ( 4 0 )
To establish (38) note that for 0 ≤ k ≤ i 1 − 1 we have that
Continuing this process we have that
where the last relation follows from the fact that v is independent of (u, s n ).
In order to establish (39), we use (34) and (36) to get, F r, j − F e, j = I(u, s n ; y r, j , y e, j |v ,
) + H(y e, j |x j , s j ) (42) ≤ H(y r, j |y e, j ) − H(y r, j |y e, j , x j , s j ) = I(s j , x j ; y r, j |y e, j ) (43)
In the above steps (41) follows from the fact that x j = X j (u, s n , ψ i j −1 ) and hence we can condition of x j i the second and fourth terms. Furthermore since the channel is memoryless
holds. It remains to establish (40). Using (35) and (37) we note that
) − H(u, s n |φ i j −1 , ψ i j −1 , y j e ) + H(u, s n |φ i j+1 −1 , ψ i j+1 −1 , y j e ) = I(u, s n ; v , y j r |φ i j+1 −1 , ψ i j+1 −1 , y j e ) − I(u, s n ; v , y j r |y j e , φ i j −1 , ψ i j −1 )
Since φ i j+1 −1 = Φ i j+1 −1 (u, s n , ψ i j+1 − 2) and ψ i j+1 −1 = Ψ i j+1 −1 (v , y j r , φ i j+1 − 2) we have that I(u, s n ; v , y j r |φ i j+1 −1 , ψ i j+1 −1 , y j e ) ≤ I(u, s n , φ i j+1 −1 ; v , y j r , ψ i j+1 −1 |φ i j+1 −2 , ψ i j+1 −2 , y j e ) = I(u, s n ; v , y j r |φ i j+1 −2 , ψ i j+1 −2 , y j e ) and continuing this process we have that I(u, s n ; v , y j r |φ i j+1 −1 , ψ i j+1 −1 , y j e ) ≤ I(u, s n ; v , y j r |y j e , φ i j −1 , ψ i j −1 ) as required.
GAUSSIAN CASE
In this section we develop the corresponding results for the Gaussian case. where we have used the fact that the conditional entropy h(y r |y e ) is maximized by a Gaussian distribution. The above expression immediately reduces to (13).
Proof of Theorem 7
Since the Gaussian model satisfies the condition in Theorem 5, it suffices to evaluate C = I(x, s; y r |y e ).
I(x, s; y r |y e ) = h(y r |y e ) − h(y r |y e , x, s) (44) = h(y r |y e ) − h(z r |z e ) (45)
which upon simplifying yields the desired expression.
